getd-ui-librarynpm
Malicious code in getd-ui-library (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, postinstall.js runs unconditionally (scripts.postinstall = 'node postinstall.js') and sends an HTTPS GET to a hardcoded webhook.site URL carrying the installer's hostname (os.hostname()), username (os.userInfo().username), platform (os.platform()), current working directory (process.cwd()), and CI-detection environment variables (CI, BUILD_BUILDID, AGENT_NAME) as query parameters. webhook.site is an anonymous request-capture service — whoever holds the UUID receives identifying telemetry from every machine that installs this package, useful for follow-on targeting (CI build agent fingerprinting, developer host enumeration). Errors from the request are swallowed silently. The package additionally occupies the unscoped name getd-ui-library to mimic the legitimate scoped @getd/ui-library package; any developer who mistypes the install name receives this beacon. The package's own README framing this as 'defensive squat' research does not change the installer-side impact: host/user/cwd identifiers leave the machine on every install with no opt-in.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for getd-ui-library (version 0.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging getd-ui-library across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
getd-ui-library is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If getd-ui-library was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks getd-ui-library before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- ReversingLabs · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks getd-ui-library-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.