getd-transactional-webnpm
Malicious code in getd-transactional-web (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, postinstall.js issues an HTTPS GET to https://webhook.site/18dc4281-d366-438a-9186-76fbcd56ade5 carrying os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, os.platform(), process.cwd(), CI environment indicators (CI, BUILD_BUILDID, AGENT_NAME), and the package name/version. Errors are swallowed silently. The destination is an anonymous third-party request-bin, not a publisher-owned endpoint, so any party holding the webhook URL receives identifying information about every machine that installs this package. The package's README frames itself as a 'defensive squat' of the @getd scoped namespace, but the data flow — installer identifiers leaving the host to an unaffiliated request-bin without consent — is identical to a malicious typosquat beacon. The combination of a name that lures users targeting @getd/* and an unauthenticated metadata beacon at install time is installer-harming regardless of stated intent.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for getd-transactional-web (version 0.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging getd-transactional-web across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
getd-transactional-web establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If getd-transactional-web was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks getd-transactional-web before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- ReversingLabs · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks getd-transactional-web-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.