get-deps-pathnpm
Malicious code in get-deps-path (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On require(), get-deps-path immediately invokes getPlugin(), which performs an HTTP fetch to https://jsonkeeper.com/b/QBRMI (an anonymous public paste host where any user can mutate content) and passes the response's model field directly to eval(). The fetched JavaScript executes in the installer's Node process with no integrity check, no version pin, and no signature verification — whoever controls the paste controls code execution on every machine that imports this module. The package additionally masquerades: package.json keywords are ['koa','middleware','compose'] and index.js is a koa-compose clone, while the package name and README advertise unrelated 'dependency install' functionality. The mismatch between the advertised purpose, the visible source code, and the embedded import-time eval-from-mutable-URL is the cover-story shape of a deliberate backdoor, not a misconfiguration.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for get-deps-path (6 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging get-deps-path across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
get-deps-path establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If get-deps-path was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks get-deps-path before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks get-deps-path-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.