gehnebnpm
Malicious code in gehneb (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares "consolefy": "git+https://github.com/ccndjdjdnnddnd-jpg/sbdrsfhbrfh.git" instead of resolving the legitimate consolefy package from the npm registry. The git URL has no commit SHA, tag, or branch pin, so npm install clones whatever HEAD points to at install time — fully mutable by the owner of that throwaway GitHub account (random-character username, unrelated to the legitimate consolefy publisher). The package's library entry (lib/index.js) transitively loads lib/Classes/Client.js and lib/Classes/CommandHandler.js, both of which require("consolefy") at module top level, so any code the attacker pushes to that repo executes on every installer that requires gehneb. Combined signals: empty description and empty author metadata, short opaque package name, and a Baileys/WhatsApp-bot dependency surface re-published under unrelated branding. The unpinned-attacker-repo override alone provides a silent install-time/require-time RCE channel into the installer's environment.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for gehneb (version 1.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging gehneb across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove gehneb from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If gehneb was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks gehneb before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks gehneb-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.