Which versions of gator-client are malicious?

The following npm versions of gator-client are flagged malicious: 9.9.11. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate gator-client if I installed it?

gator-client is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed gator-client — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If gator-client was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is gator-client part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — gator-client is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-003544, IN-MAL-2026-003545 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find gator-client across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for gator-client (version 9.9.11). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging gator-client across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

gator-clientnpm

Malicious code in gator-client (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4569

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall gator-client

What this malware does

On npm install (via scripts.install: node index.js) and on every require('gator-client'), lib/core.js collects os.userInfo().username, os.hostname(), and the basename of process.cwd(), then issues a dns.resolve4() query for lwgator.<user>.<host>.<cwd>.<ts>.oob.sl4x0.xyz, leaking installer host identifiers over DNS to an attacker-controlled out-of-band domain. The function name resolve4, the module names os/dns/process, and the C2 domain oob.sl4x0.xyz are stored as decimal byte arrays in lib/b02e30.js and lib/6ad264.js and decoded via String.fromCharCode at runtime (paired with hex-style identifiers like _0x5b3d) to evade naive string scanners. The package's advertised purpose ("Enterprise-grade utilities with enhanced validation and compatibility layer") is a cover story: src/ ships plausible-looking benign modules, but the only code reached from the install hook and main entry is the beacon. The author email [email protected] matches the exfil domain sl4x0.xyz, confirming attacker ownership of the receiving infrastructure. DNS-based exfiltration is specifically chosen to bypass HTTP egress filters that would otherwise block outbound POSTs.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

9.9.11

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

1925735d02fb91f74a11718c3402ad0b10f551eecb8c6d88f02d475b3e0a799f

82a9b9bbbc91bb4f55b84e72bc8735b30d4090baf79501f92acb96a5ec54348e

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for gator-client (version 9.9.11). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging gator-client across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
gator-client is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If gator-client was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks gator-client before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. gator-client on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 9.9.11 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-003544IN-MAL-2026-003545

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks gator-client-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring