frontend-orbnpm

npm/frontend-orb is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

frontend-orb is published as a CircleCI orb (YAML CI helpers under src/), but its package.json declares a preinstall hook that runs setup.mjs. setup.mjs is itself obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style hex identifiers such as _0x488df8, _0x52943e, string-object property-lookup tables in helpers mu/dl/xn/xb) and performs a drop-and-exec sequence: it builds a URL against github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/, fetches the Bun runtime binary to a temp path, chmods it 0755, and then execFileSync's the downloaded Bun against a sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a 727KB single-line file with obfuscator.io fingerprints (rotating string-array decoder WV8StW that shifts a large numeric/string constant array n7gIxM, hex-mangled identifiers) and is not referenced by any of the orb YAML files. The advertised purpose of the package (a CircleCI orb) has no need for a JavaScript runtime, an obfuscated loader, or a 727KB opaque payload. On npm install, the obfuscated preinstall chain runs an opaque payload under a freshly-downloaded alternate runtime, giving the publisher arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine while evading Node-based introspection.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.