form-bnpl-dolyame-component-objectnpm
form-bnpl-dolyame-component-object is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12384) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 20.8.9). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in form-bnpl-dolyame-component-object (npm)
What this malware does
On require() of the package, polyfill.js selects a platform-specific binary and downloads it over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers subdomains whose hostnames are assembled via array-join string splits to defeat static detection (e.g. oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, cf101-adf.workers.dev, cf103-070.workers.dev, cf99-9b3.workers.dev), with a DNS-TXT fallback under *.dl.well1.site. The downloaded bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (dotnet_diag<hex>.exe on Windows,.cache_<hex> on Unix), chmod 0755, and spawned detached via cp.spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", fp + " &"], {detached:true}) or cmd.exe start /b. Environment-variable names such as DISABLE_TELEMETRY, ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT, and DO_NOT_TRACK are used as a cover story alongside an analytics_state TTL stamp. A second 81KB lib/telemetry.js bundle ships alongside containing the same cp.spawn + chmod 755 dropper pattern. The package's declared purpose is a BNPL form component, which does not require downloading and executing platform-specific binaries from anonymous workers.dev hosts.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for form-bnpl-dolyame-component-object (version 20.8.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging form-bnpl-dolyame-component-object across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove form-bnpl-dolyame-component-object from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If form-bnpl-dolyame-component-object was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks form-bnpl-dolyame-component-object before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks form-bnpl-dolyame-component-object-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.