fork-angular-daterangepickernpm
Malicious code in fork-angular-daterangepicker (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares a preinstall lifecycle hook ("preinstall": "node index.js") that runs index.js on every npm install. index.js line 3 hardcodes https://d8s1eti9io6kqja3sg5gsyqs4aqawhqxg.oast.live/npm-installed and issues an HTTPS GET to that endpoint at install time. oast.live is an Interactsh / OAST collaborator service; the unique per-subdomain identifier lets whoever generated it confirm — out-of-band — which hosts installed the package, capturing the installer's source IP, DNS resolver, and install timestamp. The package self-describes as a "PoC package for dependency confusion testing" and its name impersonates the legitimate angular-daterangepicker package, indicating the beacon's purpose is to verify dependency-confusion hits inside private/internal build environments. Even when framed as a "PoC", running this on a real installer leaks network-position metadata to a third party without consent.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'fork-angular-daterangepicker' @ 11.0.0 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for fork-angular-daterangepicker (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging fork-angular-daterangepicker across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
fork-angular-daterangepicker establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If fork-angular-daterangepicker was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks fork-angular-daterangepicker before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks fork-angular-daterangepicker-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.