forge-jsx2npm
forge-jsx2 is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-5568) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.123, 1.0.124, 1.0.125…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in forge-jsx2 (npm)
What this malware does
The package masquerades as an 'Autodesk Forge' integration but ships no Forge API code. On npm install, scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs materializes a durable copy of the package outside node_modules (under a hidden .forge-jsxyz/runtime/ directory), spawns dist/cli-agent.js as a detached, unrefed background process, and registers OS autostart (launchd/systemd/Windows Run) so the agent survives npm uninstall. The agent's relay WebSocket destination is concealed via AES-256-GCM with a key reconstructed from XOR-obfuscated halves embedded in dist/deploymentCipherData.js; a leftover diagnostic script (scripts/windows-forge-diagnostics.ps1) reveals the hidden host as 212.193.3.61:9877. Once connected, the agent (1) walks the entire filesystem (/ on POSIX, every drive on Windows) via dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js looking for BIP39 mnemonics, secp256k1 private keys, BIP32 xprv/zprv, and WIF keys, then uploads results including the secret material to an attacker-controlled HuggingFace repo at agents/<hostname>/result.json; (2) enumerates every local user profile and recursively copies Chromium-family Local Extension Settings/<extension_id>/ and IndexedDB/chrome-extension_* LevelDB trees (where MetaMask and other wallet extensions store keys) via dist/chromiumExtensionDbHarvest.js and uploads them to HuggingFace via dist/extensionDbHfUpload.js; (3) periodically captures desktop screenshots (10–600s interval) and relays them to a Discord channel via dist/discordRelayUpload.js using https://discord.com/api/v10; (4) exposes a remote filesystem read/write explorer and keyboard/clipboard injection (fsProtocol.js, filesExplorer.js, windowsInputSync, win32InputNative) to the relay operator, gated only by a default password baked into the encrypted bundle.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for forge-jsx2 (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging forge-jsx2 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
forge-jsx2 is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If forge-jsx2 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks forge-jsx2 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks forge-jsx2-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.