Which versions of font-huge are malicious?

The following npm versions of font-huge are flagged malicious: 2.5.3. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate font-huge if I installed it?

font-huge is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed font-huge — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If font-huge was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is font-huge part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — font-huge is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-010314 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find font-huge across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for font-huge (version 2.5.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging font-huge across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

font-hugenpm

Malicious code in font-huge (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10492

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall font-huge

What this malware does

font-huge advertises itself as a font/icon collection, but its exported getPlugin function fetches https://svganchordev.net/icons/107 and passes the response's data.credits field to new Function with require, module, process, Buffer, and other Node primitives injected, then invokes it — executing attacker-controlled JavaScript with full Node privileges whenever a consumer imports and calls the default export. The destination host is unrelated to the package's declared purpose and is constructed by concatenating split literals (domain "svganchordev.net", path "/icons/", token "107") to obscure the URL in source. Retry logic and empty catch blocks suppress errors from the fetch. The package's declared dependencies (@primno/dpapi for Windows DPAPI decryption, better-sqlite3/sqlite3 for browser profile databases, node-machine-id, socket.io-client) are not referenced anywhere in the shipped code and match the runtime primitives a browser-credential stealer payload would need after being loaded via the remote eval.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

2.5.3

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

a529537a0875d6ab8e2c942ace1db227c7131ff06b7eb4e86b12cd4193da4879

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for font-huge (version 2.5.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging font-huge across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
font-huge is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If font-huge was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks font-huge before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. font-huge on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 2.5.3 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-010314

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks font-huge-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring