fluid-type-uinpm
fluid-type-ui is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11136) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious versions 2.0.8, 2.0.9). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in fluid-type-ui (npm)
What this malware does
src/index.js in [email protected] contains a hidden code block, pushed off-screen by a long run of tab characters, that runs when the module is loaded via require. The block queries Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoints (1rpc.io/eth, eth.drpc.org, eth.blockscout.com) for a transaction from the hardcoded address 0xa322e5f3d311d3080e6f0121063e9adc2490ef1a, extracts two IPv4 addresses embedded in the transaction's to field, HTTP-GETs /0x/ls from the first, XOR-decrypts the response with a 16-byte key, and passes the decoded bytes to eval with a prelude that binds global.r=require and global.m=module. The result is arbitrary attacker-controlled code execution on every require of the package, with the command-and-control destination mutable via new on-chain transactions, making takedown resistant. The package is presented as a Tailwind plugin; the EtherHiding-style loader has no relationship to that stated purpose.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for fluid-type-ui (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging fluid-type-ui across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
fluid-type-ui establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If fluid-type-ui was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks fluid-type-ui before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks fluid-type-ui-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.