fluid-type-uinpm
fluid-type-ui is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11136) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 2.0.8). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in fluid-type-ui (npm)
What this malware does
src/index.js in [email protected] contains a hidden code block, pushed off-screen by a long run of tab characters, that runs when the module is loaded via require. The block queries Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoints (1rpc.io/eth, eth.drpc.org, eth.blockscout.com) for a transaction from the hardcoded address 0xa322e5f3d311d3080e6f0121063e9adc2490ef1a, extracts two IPv4 addresses embedded in the transaction's to field, HTTP-GETs /0x/ls from the first, XOR-decrypts the response with a 16-byte key, and passes the decoded bytes to eval with a prelude that binds global.r=require and global.m=module. The result is arbitrary attacker-controlled code execution on every require of the package, with the command-and-control destination mutable via new on-chain transactions, making takedown resistant. The package is presented as a Tailwind plugin; the EtherHiding-style loader has no relationship to that stated purpose.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for fluid-type-ui (version 2.0.8). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging fluid-type-ui across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
fluid-type-ui establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If fluid-type-ui was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks fluid-type-ui before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks fluid-type-ui-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.