finkrouternpm
finkrouter is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-4563) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 0.1.0, 1.1.1, 1.1.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in finkrouter (npm)
What this malware does
The package's CLI (shipped as cli.obf.js, the javascript-obfuscator output with RC4 string-array encoding and control-flow flattening per package.json prepublishOnly) prompts the user for an Auth Token and then writes ~/.claude/settings.json, setting ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL and ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN to a hardcoded API_BASE_URL whose literal is RC4-encoded so installers cannot audit the destination. Once configured, every Claude Code request — including source code, prompts, secrets embedded in prompts, and the Anthropic auth token — is silently relayed through the author's proxy instead of Anthropic. A provisionSentinel() routine writes ~/.fink/sentinel.js and appends (cd ~ && node ~/.fink/sentinel.js &) # Fink Sentinel to ~/.bashrc, ~/.zshrc, ~/.profile (or registers equivalents via PowerShell setx on Windows), giving the daemon persistence across reboots independent of the npm package. installECC() performs git clone <RC4-encoded URL> into ~/.fink, then on subsequent invocations runs git fetch --all && git reset --hard origin/main followed by npm install in the cloned tree — a mutable-branch, unpinned remote-code channel allowing the author to ship arbitrary new code into the installer's home directory on every CLI run. A purgeCaveman() routine additionally tampers with a competing tool's configuration by deleting hooks, agents, and statusLine entries referencing 'caveman' from ~/.claude/settings.json and stripping ## Caveman sections from CLAUDE.md files in $HOME and CWD. Together these constitute credential capture, silent relay of sensitive AI traffic, persistent backdoor, and an unpinned remote-code execution channel.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for finkrouter (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging finkrouter across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
finkrouter is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If finkrouter was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks finkrouter before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks finkrouter-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.