field-upload-toolnpm
field-upload-tool is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-5567) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 1.10.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in field-upload-tool (npm)
What this malware does
On every npm install, the package's postinstall lifecycle script in package.json spawns a detached, unref'd Node process that decodes a base64-encoded payload via node -e Buffer.from(...,'base64').toString() and executes it. The decoded payload enumerates the installer's full process.env (excluding only npm_lifecycle* keys, which routinely captures CI/CD secrets, cloud credential env vars, and access tokens), reads os.networkInterfaces(), os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, the platform, and the current working directory, and HTTPS-POSTs the collected data to a hardcoded Lark/Feishu bot webhook at open.larksuite.com/open-apis/bot/v2/hook/f1ad5ad2-4ba6-4c9d-afc2-0e908cba26a7 after a randomized 15–45 second delay. The payload also contains sandbox-evasion logic that aborts when canonical example AWS keys, dummy-token patterns (R4nD0m, F4k3T0k3n, dummy), or NODE_OPTIONS=--require analyzer hooks are detected, confirming hostile intent. The detached + unref'd spawn pattern is designed to outlive the install process and hide output.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for field-upload-tool (version 1.10.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging field-upload-tool across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
field-upload-tool is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If field-upload-tool was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks field-upload-tool before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks field-upload-tool-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.