Which versions of fhirproxy are malicious?

The following npm versions of fhirproxy are flagged malicious: 90.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate fhirproxy if I installed it?

fhirproxy is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove fhirproxy, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.

I already installed fhirproxy — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If fhirproxy was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is fhirproxy part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — fhirproxy is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-005165, IN-MAL-2026-005166, GHSA-g7wh-3cfq-x8m2 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find fhirproxy across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for fhirproxy (version 90.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging fhirproxy across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

fhirproxynpm

Malicious code in fhirproxy (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5460

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall fhirproxy

What this malware does

[email protected] is a thin loader package whose only behavior is to pull and execute the dependency fhirproxy-utils. package.json declares both preinstall and postinstall hooks that run node index.js, and index.js's only meaningful statement is require('fhirproxy-utils'). That dependency is fetched from npm at install time and its top-level code runs on the installer's machine during npm install without further user interaction. The package additionally claims a bin map that aliases the names of widely used developer tools — webpack, webpackcli, vite, eslint, jest, tsc, tsnode, prettier, next, nodemon, turbo — all pointing at the same index.js. Once installed, node_modules/.bin/<tool> resolves to this package, so any subsequent invocation of those commands in the project (CI builds, local dev scripts) re-executes index.js and re-loads fhirproxy-utils instead of the genuine tool. The package presents itself as OpenMRS REST tooling (author: "OpenMRS Community Contributor", version 90.0.0, 351-byte stub printing [+] OpenMRS REST Utilities Subsystem Initialized.), but real OpenMRS packages are scoped under @openmrs/* and published by named maintainers — this is impersonation, not a real OpenMRS project. The combination of impersonation metadata, lifecycle-hook execution of an opaque dependency, and bin-hijacking of common dev tooling forces installer-side execution of attacker-controlled code at install time and on every subsequent invocation of any hijacked tool name.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

90.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

96e092973bad8e995bdec34000e45943e0be59996e84f181ee4bee9cd423f8eb

f10d16da1fb5b7ed2d0dc07f015466cee8f7b2ba9c118ac7c6989c717ac3dd62

3e79c782816c05ce4e9ed0422b47d60228b6b1c61c3cf26196177ea0a0c56e00

Detection & response playbook

Typosquat

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for fhirproxy (version 90.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging fhirproxy across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
fhirproxy is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove fhirproxy, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If fhirproxy was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks fhirproxy before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. fhirproxy on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 90.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-005165IN-MAL-2026-005166GHSA-g7wh-3cfq-x8m2

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks fhirproxy-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring