fe-utils-corenpm
Malicious code in fe-utils-core (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's default-exported getPlugin function fetches https://svganchordev.net/icons/110 and passes the response's data.credits field to new Function() with require, process, Buffer, module, exports, and Promise injected — executing arbitrary attacker-controlled JavaScript with full Node privileges whenever a caller invokes the documented API. The endpoint is hardcoded to a domain unrelated to the package's stated purpose and is not referenced in README. Errors are swallowed and the request silently retried, which is consistent with covert C2 behavior. The declared dependency set (@primno/dpapi for Windows DPAPI decryption, node-machine-id, better-sqlite3 and sqlite3 for browser/credential database access, socket.io-client for persistent C2, axios/express/request) is unused by the small advertised utility surface (~30 lines of debounce/throttle/isEmpty helpers in src/utils.js) but is pre-positioned in node_modules so a remote-fetched payload can require() these capabilities without a second fetch. The combination — remote-fetch-and-eval plus a credential-harvesting toolkit pre-installed as dependencies — leaves no benign interpretation.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for fe-utils-core (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging fe-utils-core across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
fe-utils-core is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If fe-utils-core was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks fe-utils-core before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks fe-utils-core-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.