fabric-render-bridgenpm
fabric-render-bridge is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-17225) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in fabric-render-bridge (npm)
What this malware does
package.json declares postinstall="node index.js", so npm install fabric-render-bridge automatically executes index.js. index.js reads Minecraft launcher credential stores across multiple launchers (launcher_accounts.json and launcher_profiles.json for the official launcher, PrismLauncher, MultiMC, TLauncher, Modrinth, PolyMC, GDLauncher) plus a session dump from the OS temp directory, extracts accessToken/refreshToken values and account usernames, and POSTs them via https.request to a hardcoded Discord webhook at discord.com/api/webhooks/1554065488726990909/. A separate sendInfo() routine POSTs os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, os.platform() and os.release() to the same webhook on every install. The package presents itself as a Fabric render bridge but ships no rendering functionality; its sole install-time behavior is credential and host-identity theft.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for fabric-render-bridge (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging fabric-render-bridge across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
fabric-render-bridge is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If fabric-render-bridge was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks fabric-render-bridge before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks fabric-render-bridge-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.