exxpress-utilsnpm
Malicious code in exxpress-utils (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package declares scripts.postinstall pointing at postinstall.js, which runs automatically on npm install. The script performs three attacker-benefit actions concurrently: (1) reads ~/.npmrc, ~/.env, and ~/.git-credentials and extracts npm _authToken / npm_<36> tokens, NPM_TOKEN, NPM_AUTH_TOKEN, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, GITHUB_TOKEN, and git URLs with embedded credentials; (2) enumerates Chrome / Brave / Edge / Chromium / Vivaldi / Opera profile directories under Local Extension Settings/<walletId> for 71 hardcoded crypto-wallet extension IDs (MetaMask nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn, Phantom, Coinbase Wallet, Trust Wallet, Ledger, Trezor, etc.) and regex-scans their logs for vault/seed/mnemonic/privateKey/password patterns; (3) walks ~/Documents, ~/Desktop, ~/Downloads for files matching crypto-keyword names and reads their contents. Harvested JSON is POSTed to the hardcoded C2 http://149.28.127.35:8888 over plain HTTP via http.request. The package name is a double-x typosquat of express; the advertised purpose is 'utility helpers', index.js is a no-op stub whose description contradicts the package name ('Lodash JavaScript utilities bundle'), and postinstall.js contains self-incriminating header comments ('Token harvester + Crypto wallet scanner', 'Silent. Zero trace.'). Every structural fingerprint of a credential/wallet stealer is present: hardcoded C2 bound to http.request in a lifecycle hook, browser wallet-extension-ID lookup, seed-phrase directory scanner, and token-regex extraction from ~/.npmrc / ~/.env / ~/.git-credentials.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for exxpress-utils (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging exxpress-utils across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
exxpress-utils is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If exxpress-utils was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks exxpress-utils before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks exxpress-utils-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.