express-router-enginenpm
Malicious code in express-router-engine (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The sole shipped file index.js is a heavily obfuscated (RC4 + base64 string-array, 337-entry rotated array, control-flow flattening) IIFE that executes at require() time. On load it constructs a URL from encrypted string constants plus the package version, issues an HTTP GET with an Authentication header, splits the response body on ':' to derive a symmetric key and IV, decrypts the payload with crypto.createDecipheriv, writes the decrypted bytes to a file under a temp/home path, and executes that file via child_process.exec with windowsHide:true. All module names (fs, os, path, child_process, http client), the fetch URL, header name/value, crypto algorithm, and temp path components are stored encrypted in the string array — the obfuscation exists purely to hide the C2 URL and payload pipeline. The package name (express-router-engine) also mismatches its own description text (express-route-engine is a lightweight routing framework...), consistent with name-confusion against a legitimate routing helper. Any consumer that requires this package fetches and executes attacker-controlled code on the installer's machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for express-router-engine (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging express-router-engine across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
express-router-engine establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If express-router-engine was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks express-router-engine before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks express-router-engine-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.