exodus-checkout-signernpm
Malicious code in exodus-checkout-signer (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
exodus-checkout-signer is the unscoped name of the scoped package @exodus/checkout-signer and self-describes (in README and package.json) as a dependency-confusion proof-of-concept targeting installers who follow Exodus's documented install command and drop the scope. The package's main entry throws on require so any caller fails loudly, but on npm install the postinstall script unconditionally runs node src/canary.js, which performs a DNS lookup and an HTTPS GET to 96e03fa6c292469a-172-245-86-254.serveousercontent.com — a Serveo SSH-tunneling endpoint with a raw IP (172.245.86.254) embedded in the subdomain — passing the package name and version as query parameters (/canary-install?pkg=...&ver=...). No installer secrets are exfiltrated, but every installation reveals the victim's source IP, timing, and corporate-network egress to an anonymous third-party tunnel operator that is not affiliated with the impersonated Exodus publisher. The combined name-confusion against a top-shelf wallet vendor's documented scope plus install-time beaconing to attacker-controllable infrastructure is a live supply-chain attack regardless of the author's stated 'research' intent.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for exodus-checkout-signer (version 99.0.0-canary.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging exodus-checkout-signer across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
exodus-checkout-signer is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If exodus-checkout-signer was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks exodus-checkout-signer before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks exodus-checkout-signer-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.