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Malicious package

exodus-checkout-signernpm

Malicious code in exodus-checkout-signer (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5439
Immediate action
Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.
npm uninstall exodus-checkout-signer

What this malware does

exodus-checkout-signer is the unscoped name of the scoped package @exodus/checkout-signer and self-describes (in README and package.json) as a dependency-confusion proof-of-concept targeting installers who follow Exodus's documented install command and drop the scope. The package's main entry throws on require so any caller fails loudly, but on npm install the postinstall script unconditionally runs node src/canary.js, which performs a DNS lookup and an HTTPS GET to 96e03fa6c292469a-172-245-86-254.serveousercontent.com — a Serveo SSH-tunneling endpoint with a raw IP (172.245.86.254) embedded in the subdomain — passing the package name and version as query parameters (/canary-install?pkg=...&ver=...). No installer secrets are exfiltrated, but every installation reveals the victim's source IP, timing, and corporate-network egress to an anonymous third-party tunnel operator that is not affiliated with the impersonated Exodus publisher. The combined name-confusion against a top-shelf wallet vendor's documented scope plus install-time beaconing to attacker-controllable infrastructure is a live supply-chain attack regardless of the author's stated 'research' intent.

Malicious versions

1 flagged
99.0.0-canary.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

7da50adb6560d5d1153657f16884e3acba9fd19865b0c1f6a90da176ae951f98
921c5ef246587db452bdb65aae12321f4de868e7882f9550f9b9e32300ae792c

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer
  1. Find it

    Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for exodus-checkout-signer (version 99.0.0-canary.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging exodus-checkout-signer across your stack and pipelines.

  2. If you installed it — respond

    exodus-checkout-signer is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

  3. Did it already run?

    If exodus-checkout-signer was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 blocks exodus-checkout-signer before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. exodus-checkout-signer on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 99.0.0-canary.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-005120IN-MAL-2026-005119

References

Credits

  • Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks exodus-checkout-signer-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.