exodus-checkoutnpm
exodus-checkout is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10894) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 99.0.0-canary.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in exodus-checkout (npm)
What this malware does
Package exodus-checkout self-identifies as a security-research dependency-confusion proof-of-concept targeting an internal Exodus payments SDK. It mimics the internal API surface (generateMnemonicSigningKeys, signCharge, signRefund, signCancelSubscription in src/index.js), but every exported function throws — there is no functional implementation. On npm install, src/canary.js runs a postinstall hook that performs a DNS lookup and HTTPS GET to a hardcoded serveo SSH-tunnel host (96e03fa6c292469a-172-245-86-254.serveousercontent.com/canary-install), passing the package's own name and version as query parameters. No installer data (env vars, filesystem, credentials) is read or transmitted — the beacon carries only the package's own identity. Installer-side impact: any build that resolves exodus-checkout from public npm (whether by typo, dependency confusion, or accidental inclusion) breaks at runtime because all exports throw, and emits a one-way network signal to a researcher-controlled tunnel domain that is not Exodus infrastructure and cannot be audited by Exodus or the installer. Routing to human review: name-impersonation of a vendor's internal namespace plus an install-time outbound beacon is the dependency-confusion shape, but the absence of any data exfiltration or remote-code-execution mechanism keeps this below the active-attack threshold.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for exodus-checkout (version 99.0.0-canary.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging exodus-checkout across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
exodus-checkout is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If exodus-checkout was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks exodus-checkout before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- ReversingLabs · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks exodus-checkout-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.