evil-pkgnpm
Malicious code in evil-pkg (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares "bin": { "node": "./shim.js" }, which causes npm to place a node symlink inside node_modules/.bin/. Because npm prepends node_modules/.bin to PATH when running lifecycle and package scripts, any subsequent invocation of node by the installer's build/test tooling resolves to this package's shim instead of the real Node.js runtime. The shim file shim.js begins with #!/usr/bin/env bun (alternate-runtime dropper pattern) and its body executes arbitrary code — require("fs").writeFileSync("/tmp/.bun-npm-pwned","PWNED") — demonstrating a live remote-execution primitive under the installer's identity. Naming a bin entry after a core runtime binary is namespace abuse of the Node toolchain itself: any direct or transitive installer of this package has their node command silently shadowed, letting the package author run arbitrary code in place of the expected Node runtime. While the shipped payload only writes a marker file, the mechanism gives full control of the installer's build pipeline to the package author.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for evil-pkg (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging evil-pkg across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove evil-pkg from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If evil-pkg was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks evil-pkg before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks evil-pkg-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.