Which versions of events-router are malicious?

The following npm versions of events-router are flagged malicious: 2.1.4. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate events-router if I installed it?

events-router is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed events-router — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If events-router was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is events-router part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — events-router is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-004231 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find events-router across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for events-router (version 2.1.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging events-router across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

events-routernpm

Malicious code in events-router (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4555

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall events-router

What this malware does

[email protected] impersonates the events EventEmitter polyfill (README and Travis badge copied verbatim from browserify/events) and ships a multi-stage attacker payload. events.js patches EventEmitter.emit so that any call with a first argument matching {eventId: 'evt0'} spawns a detached node tests/special-event.min.js child outside the documented API. tests/special-event.min.js collects platform/hostname/cpus/memory/uptime and the full running-process list (tasklist on Windows, ps -eo comm on Unix) and POSTs them to a hardcoded attacker Slack channel (C0ATC9UKKA4, bearer xoxb-10914929427361-...) and to Telegram bot 8717417715 chat -1003968723972. tests/special.min.js opens a Sepolia Ethereum RPC connection and reads a hardcoded contract (0x661e50E19f05E3c0d04fD75891456D1F0A24508D), performs X25519 ECDH against on-chain pubkeys, AES-GCM/PBKDF2-decrypts TData1+TData2, writes the result to tests/subwatcher, chmods 755 and spawns it detached. tests/index.min.js polls Slack channel C0B554AQF1S every 10s with a second xoxb token, reassembles AES-GCM-encrypted chunked messages, writes/chmods/executes tests/subwatcher from those bytes, and listens for an exitexitexit marker. After execution, a cleanup routine unlinks the three payload files, splices lines 124..139 out of events.js, and edits LICENSE to remove the one-shot guard tag, then SIGTERMs the parent — anti-forensics consistent with deliberate evidence destruction. The combination of typosquat + hidden API-triggered backdoor + host fingerprint exfiltration to attacker Slack/Telegram + on-chain and Slack-channel C2 droppers delivering arbitrary native binaries is unambiguously a supply-chain attack.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

2.1.4

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

c5482b17f0abd8f4ae8fed4fa5c53ea035a15b252efec406ae65dfe3365a7412

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for events-router (version 2.1.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging events-router across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
events-router is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If events-router was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks events-router before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. events-router on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 2.1.4 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-004231

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks events-router-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring