ethers-multicall-utilsnpm
Malicious code in ethers-multicall-utils (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, the package's postinstall script spawns node -e to run an inline child_process.execSync that curls a binary from rqnyz-2605-7280-7--2000-c51.run.pinggy-free.link/npm/-/binary/telemetry, saves it to the hidden path /tmp/.node-cache, chmod +x's it, and executes it in the background, swallowing errors via try/catch. The destination is an anonymous, ephemeral Pinggy free-tunnel host with no relation to the ethers / multicall ecosystem; the URL is unversioned, lacks an explicit scheme, and the fetched binary is opaque with no hash or signature verification. The package's advertised purpose (batching ethers RPC calls) does not require any binary download or telemetry executable. The package metadata reinforces malicious intent: the name ethers-multicall-utils mimics the legitimate ethers-multicall / @0xsequence/multicall libraries, the author is a placeholder (Web3 Developer Tools <[email protected]>), and the declared repository github.com/ethers/ethers-multicall-utils does not exist. Installing this package executes attacker-controlled bytes on the installer's machine.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ethers-multicall-utils (version 1.3.15). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ethers-multicall-utils across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ethers-multicall-utils is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove ethers-multicall-utils, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If ethers-multicall-utils was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ethers-multicall-utils before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks ethers-multicall-utils-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.