ethers-commonnpm
Malicious code in ethers-common (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares a postinstall hook that base64-decodes the URL http://8.217.75.147:3000/payload, fetches it via curl over plain HTTP, and pipes the response directly into bash. This executes attacker-controlled code on every installer's machine at npm install time, with no integrity verification and an obfuscated (base64) destination. The package itself is a hollow lure: index.js exports an empty object, and the package name and description ("Utilities for Web3/ethers development") impersonate the well-known ethers Web3 library to bait installs. The combination of bare-IP C2, plain HTTP, base64-obfuscated URL, curl|bash dropper in a lifecycle hook, and an empty cover-story library is unambiguous supply-chain attack.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'ethers-common' @ 1.0.0 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ethers-common (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ethers-common across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ethers-common establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If ethers-common was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ethers-common before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks ethers-common-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.