ethers-abstract-signernpm
Malicious code in ethers-abstract-signer (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, the package's postinstall hook spawns a Node one-liner that uses child_process.exec to curl/wget https://gist.githubusercontent.com/guellemilb/631fb6348967d9d475125edf67048c0e/raw/build_utils.py and pipe the response directly into python3 (falling back to node and wget variants), then eval()s the exec callback's stdout. The URL is a mutable personal GitHub Gist, not tied to the package publisher, with no version pin and no integrity check, so the Gist owner can swap in arbitrary code at any time and it will execute on every installer's machine. The package's advertised purpose is an 'ethers development aid for Solidity projects', and it impersonates the ethers.js AbstractSigner API, but index.js is effectively empty (module.exports = {}) — the only functional effect of installing the package is the remote-code fetch and execute. The name mimics the legitimate ethers ecosystem, increasing the chance of accidental installation by developers searching for an AbstractSigner helper.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ethers-abstract-signer (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ethers-abstract-signer across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ethers-abstract-signer is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove ethers-abstract-signer, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If ethers-abstract-signer was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ethers-abstract-signer before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks ethers-abstract-signer-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.