ethereum-vault-connectornpm
ethereum-vault-connector is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13739) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.1.0, 1.1.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in ethereum-vault-connector (npm)
What this malware does
ethereum-vault-connector is a malicious npm package that impersonates Euler's Ethereum Vault Connector (EVC) protocol. It carries no legitimate functionality; the published tarball contains only a package.json and an install-time payload (index.js). Both preinstall and postinstall run node index.js || true, so the code executes automatically when the package is installed.
Version 1.0.0 harvests environment variables whose names match KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASS|PRIVATE|MNEMONIC|RPC|AWS|GITHUB|NPM|KUBE|VAULT|AUTH|PGP|GPG|SEED|WALLET, the contents of ~/.npmrc and ~/.gitconfig, and directory listings of ~/.ssh, ~/.foundry/keystores, ~/.config/hardhat, and ~/.config/gcloud, along with the hostname, username, working directory, and platform. The collected JSON is exfiltrated via an HTTPS POST to https://webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09. Errors are swallowed so the install never visibly fails.
Version 1.1.0, published roughly 2.5 hours after 1.0.0 for all six packages within the same ~9-second window, reads full file contents (up to 4000 bytes) instead of just listing them. New targets include .aws/credentials, .aws/config, .ssh/id_rsa, .ssh/id_ed25519, .ssh/config, .kube/config, .docker/config.json, .netrc, .pgpass, .pypirc, .git-credentials, and two GCP credential files (application_default_credentials.json and legacy_credentials) — the ~/.config/gcloud directory listing is still collected too. It also reads local .env, .env.local, .env.production, .env.development, and secrets.env files from the working directory, and adds cryptocurrency wallet theft: key files from Solana, Anchor, NEAR, and Sui wallet paths, plus the first three files under ~/.foundry/keystores. The credential regex gains BEARER, API, INFURA, ALCHEMY, HELIUS, QUICKNODE, ANKR, and PRIVATE_KEY to catch RPC and API provider tokens. Both versions exfiltrate to the same webhook.site endpoint.
In 1.0.0, index.js opens with a fake comment claiming it is @plumenetwork/nest-artifacts, an unrelated install-time shim — @plumenetwork/nest-artifacts is not itself a malicious package, just a leftover label from whatever template the attacker reused across this batch, published by npm account mssjeep843. The fake comment was removed in 1.1.0. Five sibling packages from the same account impersonate Euler's EVC, Aerodrome Finance, Camelot AMM, and the BoringVault pattern, sharing this same webhook.site endpoint, byte-identical payload template, and 1.0.0-to-1.1.0 escalation. Two further packages from the same account (PyPI dlmm and dlmm-sdk, impersonating Meteora's DLMM SDK) ran an equivalent harvester and are tracked separately as MAL-2026-13728 and MAL-2026-13729.
Any environment that installed either version should rotate the exposed secrets and treat harvested keys as compromised, prioritizing wallet private keys and RPC/API tokens if 1.1.0 was installed.
Package impersonates Euler Labs' 'Ethereum Vault Connector' Solidity project but ships a Node.js credential stealer as index.js, invoked automatically via preinstall and postinstall lifecycle hooks. On install, index.js filters process.env for keys matching KEY/TOKEN/SECRET/PASS/PRIVATE/MNEMONIC/AWS/GITHUB/NPM/WALLET and reads standard installer credential paths (~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.netrc, ~/.npmrc, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.config/gcloud, Solana/Sui/Anchor keys, ~/.foundry/keystores) and local.env files. Collected data is exfiltrated via a detached child node process that sleeps 60-240 seconds (to outlive the install sandbox) and POSTs a JSON body to https://webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09. The script also bails out when hostname matches scan-/detonation/sandbox/ubuntu-fc-uvm patterns, username is scan/nonroot/sandbox, environment contains honey/canarytokens markers, or the npm registry is a known mirror — sandbox-evasion behavior confirming hostile intent.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ethereum-vault-connector (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ethereum-vault-connector across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ethereum-vault-connector is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If ethereum-vault-connector was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ethereum-vault-connector before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- O3 Security · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks ethereum-vault-connector-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.