eth-react-providernpm
eth-react-provider is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-14300) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in eth-react-provider (npm)
What this malware does
The package advertises itself as a React Ethereum provider exporting EthereumProvider/useProvider/useSigner/useNetwork hooks, but the shipped main entry lib/index.js contains web3.js Subscriptions code plus a large obfuscated payload wrapped in a Function("ObbvO95", "...") constructor that is invoked at module load. The payload uses randomized hex-named identifiers, a signed-integer decode table, and a doubly-unicode-escaped string body to hide its behavior from static inspection. Any consumer that require('eth-react-provider') executes this opaque code in the installer's process. The src/index.js in the tarball contains the clean web3.js source without this payload, indicating the built artifact was tampered. The README/code mismatch (documented React hook API vs. actual web3.js Subscriptions plus loader) is consistent with a trojanized lookalike package rather than a broken release.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for eth-react-provider (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging eth-react-provider across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
eth-react-provider is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove eth-react-provider, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If eth-react-provider was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks eth-react-provider before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks eth-react-provider-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.