eth-library-toolkitnpm
eth-library-toolkit is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13720) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 2.1.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in eth-library-toolkit (npm)
What this malware does
[email protected] presents itself as @ethereumjs/util — README, badges, and the repository URL point at the ethereumjs/ethereumjs-monorepo — but is published under an unaffiliated npm account (azeura [email protected]). The package's dist/index.js unconditionally executes require("commonjs-assertion") at load time, and package.json declares "commonjs-assertion": "^1.2.7" as a runtime dependency in place of the upstream ethjs-util dependency used by the real @ethereumjs/util. commonjs-assertion is not an ethereumjs project and has no functional relationship to the utility APIs this package advertises. Any consumer that installs and requires eth-library-toolkit will resolve and execute whatever code commonjs-assertion currently ships, giving the substituted package arbitrary code execution inside the installer's Node.js process. The impersonation shell plus forced third-party dependency load matches the lookalike-clone-as-delivery-vehicle supply-chain pattern.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for eth-library-toolkit (version 2.1.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging eth-library-toolkit across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
eth-library-toolkit is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove eth-library-toolkit, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If eth-library-toolkit was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks eth-library-toolkit before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks eth-library-toolkit-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.