eth-devnpm
eth-dev is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10552) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in eth-dev (npm)
What this malware does
On require(), index.js schedules a 37-second delayed routine that reads test/fixtures/keypairs.dat, base64-decodes it into ~/.cache-db/.node-sync/syncd.js (mode 0o700), and spawns it detached via node syncd.js. The dropper installs OS-specific persistence to re-execute every 12 hours: a crontab entry on Linux, a scheduled task named 'WinNodeSync' on Windows, and a LaunchAgent at ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.syncd.plist on macOS. The decoded payload ('phantom syncd v3') walks the user's home directory matching filenames and contents against wallet/seed keywords (seed, mnemonic, recovery, wallet, private, metamask, phantom, ledger, trezor,...), pulls mutable configuration from a hardcoded GitHub Gist (juang55/b298754cb72942b1cdcf02ccd45cde2f), and uploads harvested material to Pinata IPFS using hardcoded API credentials embedded in the payload. Cover-story naming (keypairs.dat as a 'test fixture', com.apple.syncd, WinNodeSync) is used to mimic legitimate system services. The package presents itself as an Ethereum utilities library.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for eth-dev (5 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging eth-dev across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
eth-dev is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If eth-dev was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks eth-dev before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks eth-dev-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.