eth-bridgenpm
eth-bridge is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11461) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in eth-bridge (npm)
What this malware does
The package presents itself as an Ethereum bridge library but its index.js is a verbatim copy of the well-known eth-sig-util signature utility (retaining internal error strings such as "eth-sig-util.normalize() requires hex string or integer input." and attributing authorship to Dan Finlay) with an additional ~47KB obfuscated payload appended at module top level. The payload is invoked immediately via a Function("BdyPFg", "...") constructor call using a custom PRNG-driven string decoder and numeric dispatch table, meaning arbitrary attacker-controlled code executes on every require('eth-bridge'). The name/description/author mismatch combined with an opaque import-time dynamic-code-execution payload is the typosquat-with-loader shape; the legitimate eth-sig-util code serves as cover for the loader.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for eth-bridge (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging eth-bridge across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
eth-bridge is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove eth-bridge, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If eth-bridge was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks eth-bridge before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks eth-bridge-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.