Which versions of envfile-sync are malicious?

The following npm versions of envfile-sync are flagged malicious: 1.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate envfile-sync if I installed it?

envfile-sync is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove envfile-sync, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.

I already installed envfile-sync — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If envfile-sync was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is envfile-sync part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — envfile-sync is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-007776 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find envfile-sync across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for envfile-sync (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging envfile-sync across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

envfile-syncnpm

Malicious code in envfile-sync (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-6589

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall envfile-sync

What this malware does

Package name is 'envfile-sync' but every user-facing artifact (README title, bin name, homepage, repository, bugs URL, badges, keywords, CHANGELOG) brands the package as 'envsync', a lookalike of an unrelated existing npm package. The advertised JS API is non-functional: exported sync/check/validate/init in src/index.js return hardcoded placeholders ({ ok: true, missing: [],...opts }) and never set the fields (r.added, r.example, r.inSync, r.createdExample) that bin/cli.js consumes — the documented surface is a stub. On module load, src/index.js:21-25 resolves bin/native/parser.node and calls process.dlopen(module, p), executing arbitrary native code from a 2.9MB undocumented Windows PE ('!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.'). The README explicitly denies any binary exists ('zero dependencies', 'No binary to install, nothing to audit'), and no JS export ever calls into a native parser API, so the binary's behavior is hidden from auditors and contradicts the package's documentation. The combination — typosquat branding to attract installs, stub JS to satisfy a casual reader, opaque native PE dlopen'd on import as the only real code path — is the canonical hidden-native-payload shape. Any consumer who imports envfile-sync on Windows runs the unverifiable native code with the host process's privileges.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

533d78538183c16b774f6e5783cc1059558ca712fd129da9666361088485e055

Detection & response playbook

Typosquat

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for envfile-sync (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging envfile-sync across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
envfile-sync is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove envfile-sync, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If envfile-sync was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks envfile-sync before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. envfile-sync on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-007776

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks envfile-sync-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring