encrypted-archivenpm
Malicious code in encrypted-archive (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, the package executes a preinstall hook (package.json "preinstall": "node index.js || true") that runs index.js, which performs a DNS resolution and HTTPS GET to a hardcoded interactsh/oast.me subdomain (d8hjn6ap4rnta9vj5ve0jk11seb4k3kci.oast.me). Each install leaks the resolver IP, public egress IP, hostname-derived identifier, and install timestamp to a third-party out-of-band interaction server. The package's own metadata states it is a dependency-confusion proof-of-concept squatting an internal Ubiquiti namespace; any build system that resolves this name from the public registry instead of the intended private registry will silently run the beacon. Regardless of the author's stated research intent, the install-time network I/O to an attacker-controlled OOB host is the canonical dependency-confusion exploitation primitive and exfiltrates installer-side network/identity data.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'encrypted-archive' @ 99.0.0 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for encrypted-archive (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging encrypted-archive across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
encrypted-archive is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If encrypted-archive was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks encrypted-archive before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks encrypted-archive-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.