Which versions of enbd-react-logger are malicious?

The following npm versions of enbd-react-logger are flagged malicious: 4.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate enbd-react-logger if I installed it?

enbd-react-logger establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed enbd-react-logger — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If enbd-react-logger was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is enbd-react-logger part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — enbd-react-logger is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-009873, GHSA-96hr-p56w-4x2m campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find enbd-react-logger across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for enbd-react-logger (version 4.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging enbd-react-logger across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

enbd-react-loggernpm

enbd-react-logger is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10231) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 4.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in enbd-react-logger (npm)

MAL-2026-10231

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall enbd-react-logger

What this malware does

The enbd-react-logger package was published to the npm registry by user 'click2ai' (maintainer email [email protected]) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name mimics the internal/private package naming convention of a target organization (an 'enbd' internal namespace (Emirates NBD-style naming)) so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency.

The package declares a preinstall hook ("npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io.

Each impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical across all packages published by this account, differing only in the package name and the target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511675212038149.

On npm install, the package's preinstall script runs examples/verify.js, which imports src/index.js and invokes init() with a hardcoded author-owned Sentry DSN (o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io/4511675212038149), then calls setUserFromPublicIp() to fetch the installer's public egress IP via cloudflare's trace endpoint, and then deliberately triggers a null-deref exception that is captureException'd with sendDefaultPii:true. The result: installer's public IP, hostname/environment context, and PII-enabled error metadata are unconditionally transmitted to the author's Sentry project at install time, with no user consent, no opt-out, and no documentation. In addition, src/index.js hardcodes the same DSN as DEFAULT_DSN and defaults sendDefaultPii:true, so any downstream code calling init() without supplying its own DSN silently routes all captured exceptions and user identities to the same author-controlled Sentry account. The package name 'enbd-react-logger' matches the naming convention of Emirates NBD ('ENBD') internal tooling; combined with a stub README, generic author metadata, and install-time phone-home, this fits the shape of a dependency-confusion attack targeting an internal package name so that a misconfigured internal build resolves the public artifact and beacons the CI/build host's egress IP to attacker infrastructure.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

4.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

9cdc21d084552fb54dabc91eaa7e69a235ded689a1b73f363cf723b3a9b77644

637a055e8882f765df21ce70631b5df679a7ed8a7fc8ab58b285622956bd2d61

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for enbd-react-logger (version 4.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging enbd-react-logger across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
enbd-react-logger establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If enbd-react-logger was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks enbd-react-logger before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. enbd-react-logger on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 4.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-009873GHSA-96hr-p56w-4x2m

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
SafeDep · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks enbd-react-logger-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

All malware advisories How O3 detects malware Vulnerability database