enbd-react-error-boundrynpm

The enbd-react-error-boundry package was published to the npm registry by user 'click2ai' (maintainer email [email protected]) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name mimics the internal/private package naming convention of a target organization (an 'enbd' internal namespace (Emirates NBD-style naming)) so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency.

The package declares a preinstall hook ("npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io.

Each impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical across all packages published by this account, differing only in the package name and the target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511675212038149.

Package name misspells the popular react-error-boundary ('boundry') but ships a Node.js wrapper around @sentry/node with no React error-boundary API. The preinstall lifecycle in package.json runs node examples/verify.js, which calls init() with a hardcoded author-owned Sentry DSN (https://<key>@o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io/4511675212038149) configured with sendDefaultPii: true, fetches the installer's public egress IP from Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace, attaches it to the Sentry user scope, deliberately triggers an exception, and flushes the event to the author's Sentry project. This fires automatically on npm install. Additionally, the exported init() in the main entry falls back to the same hardcoded DSN when the caller supplies none and no SENTRY_DSN env var is set (const dsn = options.dsn || process.env.SENTRY_DSN || DEFAULT_DSN), silently routing any consumer's captured errors, IPs, and PII to the author's Sentry project instead of the consumer's own.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.