emojifancy-printnpm
Malicious code in emojifancy-print (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package advertises itself as a colorized logger but ships a backdoor in dist/logger.js that fires automatically when the module is loaded. At require time, dist/index.js triggers logger.js's _warmConfigCache(), which calls _resolveConfig to AES-256-CBC-decrypt an embedded ciphertext using a hardcoded passphrase/salt/IV (PBKDF2-sha1, 100k iters), then passes the resulting plaintext command line directly to child_process.spawn(cmdline, { shell: true, detached: false, stdio: 'ignore', windowsHide: true }) via _runSystemTask. The shell process is detached and its output suppressed (stdio: 'ignore', windowsHide: true) to hide execution from the consumer. The rest of logger.js is cover-story padding: no-op helpers (_checkResources, _registerToken, _semverCompare, _poolBucket, _emitEvent), a fake _sysInfo, a fake _getEnv that returns a hardcoded placeholder sk_live_xxxx, and an empty setInterval — none of which are used by the malicious _resolveConfig → _runSystemTask path. The combination of import-time trigger, embedded AES-encrypted command, hardcoded key material, hidden shell execution, and deceptive documentation is an unambiguous supply-chain backdoor — anyone who installs and require()s this package executes attacker-controlled shell commands on their machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for emojifancy-print (version 5.6.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging emojifancy-print across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
emojifancy-print is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If emojifancy-print was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks emojifancy-print before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks emojifancy-print-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.