electron-orbitnpm
electron-orbit is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6723) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.3, 1.0.4, 1.0.5…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in electron-orbit (npm)
What this malware does
On require('electron-orbit'), the module unconditionally fires an auto-prefetch pipeline in Node contexts (when no document is present) that opens a raw node:net socket to electronorbit.blob.core.windows.net:443 and speaks a hand-written TLS 1.3 stack (custom ClientHello, HKDF key schedule, AES-128-GCM in aetherls.ts) rather than using https, bypassing standard TLS interception and static inspection. Every network-related string — the Azure hostname components, node:net, connect, ALPN http/1.1, HTTP request line, marker filename, and process.env enumeration keys — is XOR-obfuscated through a helper __s(key, arr). The postinstall script install.js writes an install marker to os.tmpdir()/electron_orbit_install_marker.txt containing process.env entries whose keys match path (PATH-family variables) plus process.cwd(), and separately stages os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, process.version, platform and arch into a decoy file under bin/formatters/ prefixed with a fake native-binary magic byte. On require, index.ts reads the tmpdir marker, XORs it with the string electron-orbit, hex-encodes it, and appends the result as a query-string suffix to the Azure blob URL, so the storage account's HTTP request logs capture the installer's PATH-family environment and working directory. Activation is gated: the destination host is only populated when the SHA-256 of process.env.BuildType is a substring of a hardcoded 64-hex constant (0ceaa396…8295); otherwise the source is set to %TEMP% and the request fails to resolve, keeping the payload dormant on non-targeted installers and firing only when a specific env var is set (e.g., in a chosen CI environment). The advertised purpose (Electron-style runtime discovery) has no relationship to icon fetching or SVG rendering; the icon surface is a pretext — getRegisteredIcon returns a hardcoded empty <svg> regardless of the network response.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for electron-orbit (32 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging electron-orbit across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
electron-orbit is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If electron-orbit was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks electron-orbit before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks electron-orbit-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.