editor_applicationnpm
editor_application is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12788) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 9999.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in editor_application (npm)
What this malware does
package.json declares a preinstall hook that runs node callback.js, which on npm install collects host-level identifiers (os.hostname, os.userInfo username, current working directory, npm_config_registry) and private CI repository slugs from a broad set of provider env vars (GITHUB_REPOSITORY, GitLab, Azure, Bitbucket, Travis, Drone, Buildkite, Circle, Jenkins) and transmits them via plain-HTTP GET to http://75.119.137.232:31337/depconfuse as query parameters (pkg, h, u, d, reg, ci). The version number 9999.0.0 combined with the /depconfuse path is the signature of a dependency-confusion beacon that maps internal package namespaces and CI topology of installing organizations to a hardcoded attacker-controlled bare-IP endpoint.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for editor_application (version 9999.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging editor_application across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
editor_application is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If editor_application was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks editor_application before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks editor_application-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.