editable-contractsnpm

npm/editable-contracts is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

Version 0.0.24 of editable-contracts (a mobx-based JSON editable-contracts helper published under the ServiceTitan namespace) adds install-time execution machinery not present in prior releases and not reflected in the README, src/, or dist/ tree. package.json declares scripts.preinstall = "node setup.mjs". setup.mjs uses hex-identifier and proxy-object string obfuscation to hide its constants, then downloads a Bun runtime archive from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<version>/<archive>.zip, extracts it to a temp directory, chmods the binary executable, and invokes it against a sibling file math_init.js via execFileSync. math_init.js is a single-line ~727KB string-array + rotation obfuscated bundle (marked // @bun @bun-cjs) with rotation function WV8StW and index array n7gIxM — classic javascript-obfuscator scaffolding hiding the payload's actual behavior. The obfuscated payload is unrelated to the advertised JSON-form library and is executed automatically on npm install by every downstream consumer. The pattern — grafting a preinstall dropper, an alternate-runtime fetch, and an obfuscated payload onto an otherwise legitimate library published under a trusted namespace — matches a hijacked-publish supply-chain compromise.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.