Which versions of ec-checker are malicious?

The following npm versions of ec-checker are flagged malicious: 0.0.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate ec-checker if I installed it?

ec-checker establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed ec-checker — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If ec-checker was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is ec-checker part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — ec-checker is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-008159 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find ec-checker across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ec-checker (version 0.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ec-checker across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

ec-checkernpm

Malicious code in ec-checker (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-6996

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall ec-checker

What this malware does

package.json declares a preinstall script that runs npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js. examples/verify.js initializes the package's Sentry client against a hardcoded author-owned DSN (https://bbdb73451ed2cd7e25e5529f78013624@o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io/4511621197856768) with sendDefaultPii enabled, calls setUserFromPublicIp() to resolve the installer's public IP, then deliberately throws a TypeError and flushes the Sentry event. As a result, simply running npm install ec-checker transmits the installer's public IP, hostname, OS, Node runtime info, and a stack trace to the author's Sentry project without the installer's consent. Separately, src/index.js hardcodes the same DSN as DEFAULT_DSN and falls back to it whenever a caller does not pass a dsn option or set SENTRY_DSN — and the README's quick-start invokes init() with no DSN — so consumers integrating the library per the documented usage silently upload their application's runtime exceptions (stack traces, file paths, user IPs, hostnames) to the author's Sentry tenant rather than their own. The install-time beacon gives the publisher an inventory of every machine that installs the package, and the library default turns the package into a silent relay of downstream application telemetry.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.0.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

dc8245936c8beb04bdb2bfe31a8117133823e3ffd6ed3e165d89b822dfab4a9c

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ec-checker (version 0.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ec-checker across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ec-checker establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If ec-checker was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ec-checker before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. ec-checker on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.0.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-008159

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks ec-checker-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring