dolyame-ui-inputcountnpm
dolyame-ui-inputcount is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13576) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.8.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-ui-inputcount (npm)
What this malware does
On require() of the package, helpers.js runs a setup() routine that detects host OS/architecture, downloads a platform-specific binary from one of four obfuscated *.workers.dev endpoints (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, cf100-416.workers.dev, cf102-baf.workers.dev, cf103-070.workers.dev) with DNS-TXT fallback via sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru, writes the payload to /var/tmp/.cache<hex> on Unix or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows, chmods it to 0755, and spawns it detached via cp.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', fp + ' &'], {detached:true, stdio:'ignore'}).unref(). Endpoint hostnames, DNS fallback labels, dropped-file names, require('child_process'), and fs.chmodSync are assembled from string fragments (e.g., ['oob-worker.','cf99-9b3.workers.dev'].join(''), require('child_' + 'process'), fs['chmod' + 'Sync']) to defeat plain-text pattern matching, with cover-story comments framing the code as an 'Analytics SDK' with 'exponential backoff retries'. A marker file /tmp/.analytics_state gates re-execution. The declared main entry lib/telemetry.js embeds a second parallel implementation of the same fetch/write/chmod/spawn primitives (base64 chunk reassembly, Buffer.from(chunks, 'base64'), chmod 0755, cp.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', filePath + ' &'],...)) dressed as an observability SDK. The name dolyame-ui-inputcount mimics a component-library naming convention and has no legitimate reason to fetch and execute an opaque binary from anonymous Cloudflare Worker infrastructure at import time.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-ui-inputcount (version 35.8.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-ui-inputcount across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dolyame-ui-inputcount is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove dolyame-ui-inputcount, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-ui-inputcount was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-ui-inputcount before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-ui-inputcount-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.