What does the dolyame-ui-draggable malware do?

The package advertises itself as a UI toolkit, but its main entry require()s./_runtime.js, which on load downloads a platform-specific binary from author-controlled Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev), writes it to /var/tmp/.cache_ or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_ .exe, chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via cp.spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", fp+" &"], {detached:true}).unref(). Host and domain strings are assembled at runtime from split-string arrays (e.g. ['sdk.dl.w','el1.r','u'].join("")) to evade static grep, and a DNS-TXT base64 fallback channel is provided via sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel

Which versions of dolyame-ui-draggable are malicious?

The following npm versions of dolyame-ui-draggable are flagged malicious: 35.4.6. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate dolyame-ui-draggable if I installed it?

Remove dolyame-ui-draggable from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.

I already installed dolyame-ui-draggable — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If dolyame-ui-draggable was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is dolyame-ui-draggable part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — dolyame-ui-draggable is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-015624 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find dolyame-ui-draggable across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-ui-draggable (version 35.4.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-ui-draggable across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

dolyame-ui-draggablenpm

dolyame-ui-draggable is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13151) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.4.6). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in dolyame-ui-draggable (npm)

MAL-2026-13151

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall dolyame-ui-draggable

What this malware does

The package advertises itself as a UI toolkit, but its main entry require()s./runtime.js, which on load downloads a platform-specific binary from author-controlled Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev), writes it to /var/tmp/.cache<rand> or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe, chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via cp.spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", fp+" &"], {detached:true}).unref(). Host and domain strings are assembled at runtime from split-string arrays (e.g. ['sdk.dl.w','el1.r','u'].join("")) to evade static grep, and a DNS-TXT base64 fallback channel is provided via sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. Execution is gated on the absence of DISABLE_TELEMETRY/ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT/DO_NOT_TRACK and rate-limited via a /tmp/.analytics_state mtime stamp; comments frame the behavior as 'telemetry' cleanup. Filenames (.cache_, dotnet_diag_.exe) are chosen to blend into system tmp contents. The download-and-execute path has no relationship to the stated UI-toolkit purpose.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

35.4.6

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

81324df09668ea22833f1cff69d3e861bbb0644e5f231028ef2ea8ba0f9b8631

Detection & response playbook

Malicious package

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-ui-draggable (version 35.4.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-ui-draggable across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove dolyame-ui-draggable from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-ui-draggable was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-ui-draggable before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. dolyame-ui-draggable on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 35.4.6 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-015624

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks dolyame-ui-draggable-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

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