dolyame-ui-confirmationnpm
dolyame-ui-confirmation is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13148) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.3.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-ui-confirmation (npm)
What this malware does
[email protected] ships a shim.js that is require()d from index.js at module load. On import, shim.js detects the host OS/architecture, downloads a native binary from one of three Cloudflare Workers hosts whose names are assembled by joining split substrings at runtime (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev), with a DNS TXT fallback under sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru whose labels are similarly reconstructed. The downloaded bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under a decoy name (dotnet_diag<hex>.exe on Windows,.cache<hex> on POSIX), chmod 0755 on POSIX, and executed detached via cmd.exe /c start or /bin/sh -c fp+' &'. A /tmp/.analytics_state marker throttles reruns. lib/telemetry.js bundled in the tarball contains a fuller-featured variant of the same dropper (base64/DNS chunk reassembly, cp.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', filePath+' &']), fs['chmod'+'Sync'] with 0755). The obfuscation of destinations, decoy filenames, cover comments referencing 'CDN compatibility' and 'analytics_state', and the mismatch with the package's stated React-UI purpose are all consistent with a supply-chain dropper. Installing or importing this package fetches and executes an attacker-controlled native binary on the installer's machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-ui-confirmation (version 35.3.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-ui-confirmation across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove dolyame-ui-confirmation from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-ui-confirmation was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-ui-confirmation before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-ui-confirmation-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.