dolyame-ui-checkablenpm
dolyame-ui-checkable is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13143) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.4.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-ui-checkable (npm)
What this malware does
index.js unconditionally requires./setup.js on load, so any require/import of the package auto-executes a dropper. setup.js reconstructs a list of Cloudflare workers.dev mirror hosts (e.g. oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev) via array.join string-splitting, downloads a platform-specific binary over HTTPS, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe,.cache_<rand>), chmods it 0755 on POSIX, and spawns it detached via cmd.exe or /bin/sh -c. When HTTPS mirrors fail, setup.js queries DNS TXT records on numeric subdomains of sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru, concatenates the chunks, base64-decodes them into a binary, writes it to disk, and executes it — a DNS-tunneled executable delivery channel designed to bypass HTTPS egress filtering. lib/telemetry.js contains a second copy of the same dropper primitives (require("child_"+"process"), fs["chmod"+"Sync"], cp.spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", filePath+" &"], {detached: true})) wrapped in Sentry-lookalike SDK framing. String-splitting of hostnames and API names, mismatch between the advertised "UI checkable" purpose and the fetch-and-exec behavior, use of anonymous workers.dev endpoints, and the DNS-TXT covert channel together characterize a hostile install/import-time dropper.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-ui-checkable (version 35.4.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-ui-checkable across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dolyame-ui-checkable is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove dolyame-ui-checkable, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-ui-checkable was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-ui-checkable before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-ui-checkable-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.