dolyame-ui-buttonstorenpm
dolyame-ui-buttonstore is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13554) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.8.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-ui-buttonstore (npm)
What this malware does
[email protected] is a dropper. index.js unconditionally requires setup.js on load, which selects a per-platform binary path, fetches opaque bytes over HTTPS from hosts whose names are assembled at runtime by joining split character arrays (resolved destinations include oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev), writes them to a hidden file under /tmp or %TEMP% (e.g..cache_<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmods 0755, and spawns the file detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd with stdio ignored. A DNS TXT-record fallback reassembles a base64 payload from subdomains under dl.wel1.ru (sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, net.dl.wel1.ru) when HTTPS fails. Package metadata claims 'Common TypeScript definitions' and the name mimics the 'dolyame' brand, but the tarball ships only the dropper plus a 76KB lib/telemetry.js sibling; author field is empty. The runtime-constructed destinations, hidden staging path, detached exec, and DNS-TXT fallback are intentional evasion.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-ui-buttonstore (version 35.8.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-ui-buttonstore across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dolyame-ui-buttonstore is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove dolyame-ui-buttonstore, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-ui-buttonstore was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-ui-buttonstore before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-ui-buttonstore-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.