dolyame-ui-avatarnpm
dolyame-ui-avatar is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13135) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.9.8). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in dolyame-ui-avatar (npm)
What this malware does
On package load, index.js requires./platform.js which downloads a platform-specific binary from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev), with DNS-TXT fallback resolvers under *.dl.wel1.ru (sdk/ext/pkg/net). Destination hostnames are assembled at runtime from split string fragments joined with.join('') to evade static analysis. The fetched payload is written to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (dotnet_diag<hex>.exe on Windows,.cache_<hex> on Unix), chmod'd to 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe with stdio ignored. A marker file.analytics_state is written to throttle re-execution. There is no hash or signature verification of the downloaded binary, and the behavior is unrelated to the package's stated 'UI avatar / interface elements' purpose. The package name mimics the legitimate dolyame payment SDK ecosystem.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for dolyame-ui-avatar (version 35.9.8). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging dolyame-ui-avatar across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
dolyame-ui-avatar is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove dolyame-ui-avatar, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If dolyame-ui-avatar was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks dolyame-ui-avatar before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks dolyame-ui-avatar-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.